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1. Introduction
A frequent complaint about current theories of information1 is that they are
utterly useless when it comes to establish the actual relevance of some spe-
cific piece of information. As a rule, agents assume that some content is by
default an instance of information (Sperber and Wilson [1995]). What they
often wonder is whether and how far that content may contribute to the for-
mulation of their choices and purposes, the development of their decision
processes and eventually the successful pursuit of their goals.
In light of this problem, this paper pursues two goals. The first is to pro-
vide a subjectivist interpretation of epistemic relevance (i.e. epistemically
relevant semantic information, more on this presently), thus satisfying those
critics who lament its absence and, because of it, may be skeptical about the
utility of using information-theoretical concepts to tackle conceptual prob-
lems and cognitive issues in real life. The second goal is to show that such a
subjectivist interpretation can (indeed must) be built on a veridical concep-
tion of semantic information, thus vindicating a strongly semantic theory of
information (Floridi [2004b]) and proving wrong those critics who argue
that misinformation can be relevant.
The two goals are achieved through a strategy of progressive refine-
ments. In § 2, the distinction between system-based or causal and agent-ori-
ented or epistemic relevance is introduced. In § 3, I discuss the most com-
mon and basic sense in which semantic information is said to be
epistemically relevant. This has some serious shortcomings, so, in § 4, the
basic case is refined probabilistically. The new version too can be shown to
be only partly satisfactory, so in § 5 there will be a second, counterfactual
revision. The limits of this version are finally overcome in § 6, where the
analysis is completed by providing a conclusive, meta-informational refine-
ment. In § 7, some of the advantages of the metatheoretical revision are
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illustrated. In § 8, I briefly outline some important applications of what I
shall label the subjectivist interpretation of epistemic relevance. In § 9, I
return to the problem of the connection between a strongly semantic theory
of information and the concept of epistemic relevance and explain why mis-
information cannot be relevant. In § 10, I conclude by briefly summarising
the results obtained and the possible work that lies ahead. 
A final warning before starting: “information” can mean many things
(Floridi [2004a]; Floridi [2005a]). In what follows, I concentrate only on
information understood as semantic information about reality, i.e. factual
information with an epistemic or cognitive value. A train timetable, a the-
ory in a physics book, the map of the London underground, a police report
about a road accident, the description of Peter’s breakfast, the bell ringing
when someone is at the door, are all typical illustrations that may be kept in
mind.
2. Epistemic vs. Causal Relevance
Following previous taxonomies by Cohen [1994] and Borlund [2003],
approaches to the study of relevance can be divided into two groups,
depending on whether they focus on a more system-based or a more agent-
oriented concept of relevance. System-oriented theories (S-theories) usually
analyse relevance in terms of topicality, aboutness or matching (how well
some information matches a request), especially in the information retrieval
(IR) literature, and various forms of conditional in/dependence (how some
information can help to produce some outcome), especially in logic, proba-
bility theory, philosophy of science and AI. 
Agent-oriented theories (A-theories), on the other hand, tend to analyse
relevance in terms of conversational implicature and cognitive pertinence,
especially in philosophy of language, pragmatics and psychology, and per-
ceived utility, informativeness, beneficiality and other ways of “bearing on
the matter at hand” in relation to an agent’s informational needs, especially
in IR literature and in epistemology. Adapting a distinction introduced by
Hitchcock [1992], S-theories and A-theories may be seen to be interested
mainly in causal relevance and epistemic relevance respectively.
S-theories clearly do not try to define, but rather presuppose, the funda-
mental concept of relevance understood as a relation between some infor-
mation and an informee.2 A similar conclusion may be reached regarding
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the logical literature, which has concentrated mainly on S-theories, provid-
ing a variety of formalizations of logics for relevance-related notions such
as conditional independence, subjunctive conditionals, novelty, causal
change and co-variance (also known as perturbation models).3 In this con-
text, Weingartner and Schurz [1986] distinguish between two types of rele-
vance, one à la Aristotle (a-relevance) and the other à la Körner (k-rele-
vance). Their point is that “an inference (or the corresponding valid
implication) is a-relevant if there is no propositional variable and no predi-
cate which occurs in the conclusion but not in the premises. And an infer-
ence (or in general any valid formula) is k-relevant if it contains no single
occurrence of a subformula which can be replaced by its negation salva
validitate”.4 Clearly, neither a-relevance nor k-relevance addresses the
problem of epistemic relevance. It is not surprising then that some years
later, in a ground-breaking article on relevant properties and causal rele-
vance, Delgrande and Pelletier [1998] could still conclude that “as men-
tioned at the outset, we feel that ‘relevant’ is a concept for which we have
no deep understanding” (p. 166). They made no attempt to connect their
analysis to an informee-oriented explanation of epistemic relevance. How-
ever, in an equally important work on relevance relations in propositional
logic, published the year before, Lakemeyer [1997] had already tried to
bridge the gap between the two kinds of relevance: “Perhaps the most dis-
tinctive feature that sets this work apart from other approaches to relevance
is the subjective point of view. In particular, we try to capture relevance
relations relative to the deductive capabilities of an agent. For example, two
agents who are given the same information may very well differ in their
opinion about whether p is relevant to q. Even the same agent may at first
miss a connection between the two, which may be discovered upon further
reflection. For instance, a student solving a geometry problem involving a
right-angled rectangle may not see the connection to the Pythagorean Theo-
rem.” (p. 138) We shall see that this is a promising starting point.
The current situation can be summarised thus: some philosophical work
has been done on several formal aspects of system-based or causal rele-
vance, but the key question, namely what it means for some information to
be relevant to some informee, still needs to be answered. We lack a founda-
tional theory of agent-oriented or epistemic relevance. The warming up is
over. The time has come to roll up our sleeves.
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3. The Basic Case
Strawson once remarked that “stating is not a gratuitous and random human
activity. We do not, except in social desperation, direct isolated and uncon-
nected pieces of information at each other.” (Strawson [1964], p. 92).
Rather, according to his Principle of Relevance, we “intend in general to
give or add information about what is a matter of standing or current inter-
est or concern.” (p. 92). He was right, of course, and one may add that giv-
ing or adding information happens most commonly through interactions of
questions and answers. So let us start from an abstract definition of the most
basic case of relevant information and then a couple of examples. 
It is common to assume that some information i is relevant (R) to an
informee/agent a with reference to a domain d in a context c, at a given
level of abstraction5 (LoA) l, if and only if
1) a asks (Q) a question q about d in c at l, i.e. Q (a, q, d, c, l), and
2) i satisfies (S) q as an answer about d in c, at l, i.e. S (i, q, d, c, l)
In short:
R (i) ↔ (Q (a, q, d, c, l) ∧ S (i, q, d, c, l)) [1]
The basic idea expressed by [1] is simple: “the train to London leaves at
13.15” is relevant to Mary if and only if Mary has asked for that piece of
information about train timetables in such and such circumstance and with
the usual linguistic conventions, and “the train to London leaves at 13.15”
satisfies her request.
Formula [1] is what we find applied by services like Amazon or eBay,
when they suggest to a user a new item that might be relevant to her, given
her past queries. It is also what lies behind the working of databases and
Boolean searches, including Google queries.
3.1 Advantages of the basic case
The formulation provided in [1] has several advantages, which explain why
it is so popular. 
a) [1] explicitly identifies semantic information as the ultimate rele-
vance-bearer. Other candidates in the literature on relevance comprise
events, facts, documents, formulae, propositions, theories, beliefs, and mes-
sages, but Cohen [1994] has convincingly argued that relevance is proposi-
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tional. He is largely correct, but while any proposition may be interpreted
informationally, not all semantic information (e.g. a map) is propositional,
so [1] simply brings to completion his reduction. 
b) [1] takes into account the informee’s interests by explicitly making
the relevance of i depend on her queries. No semantic information is rele-
vant per se, relevance being an informee-oriented concept, as anyone who
has been listening to airport announcements knows only too well. This
move is crucial, since it means that causal relevance can be better under-
stood if the informee is considered part of (i.e., is embedded in) the mecha-
nism that gives rise to it. More explicitly, this means grounding relations of
causal relevance on relations of epistemic relevance.
c) [1] couples relevance and the domain d about which, the context c in
which, and the LoA l at which the relevant information is sought. Rele-
vance is situational (Borlund [2003]): the same informee can find the same
information relevant or irrelevant depending on d, c and l. 
d) [1] analyses relevance erotetically, in terms of logic of questions and
answers (Groenendijk [2003]), and this is a strength, since it is a standard
and robust way of treating semantic information in information theory
(Shannon and Weaver [1949 rep. 1998]), in information algebra (Kohlas
[2003]) and in the philosophy of information (Floridi [2004a]). Note that
the class of questions discussed excludes those which are “loaded”.6
e) [1] also seeks to provide an objective sense of relevance insofar as i is
not any information, but only the information that actually satisfies q at
some LoA l. 
f) Finally, [1] constrains the amount of subjectivity involved in the anal-
ysis of relevance. This is achieved by assuming that the agent a in [1] is a
type of rational agent which satisfies the so-called Harsanyi doctrine (Har-
sanyi [1968]). This point deserves some comments.
According to the Harsanyi doctrine, also known in game theory as the
“common prior assumption”, if two or more rational agents share a set of
beliefs (the common prior assumption) about the possible state of the world,
expressed by means of a probability distribution over all possible states,
then – if they receive some new information about the world and if they
update their set of beliefs by making them conditional (Bayesian learning)
on the information received – they obtain the same revised probability (the
posterior probability). So, if their new, updated beliefs differ, the conclusion
is that this is because they have received different information. As Aumann
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[1976] synthetically put it: “differences in subjective probabilities should be
traced exclusively to differences in information”.
The model is both famous and controversial. In our case, it can be used
not as an abstract, if still phenomenologically reliable, description of
agents’ behaviour, but as a definition of what an idealised yet not unrealistic
rational agent should be. The proposal is to define a as belonging to the
class of (rational) agents who, if they share the same information about the
probable realization of an event, should hold the same beliefs about it (they
reach the same subjective probability assignments). This allows one to treat
differences in beliefs among rational agents, and hence in their querying
processes, as completely explainable in terms of differences in their infor-
mation.7 In game theory, this is called reaching consistent alignment of
beliefs.
To conclude, the connection between the informee-oriented and the
query-satisfaction-based features explains that [1] supports a subjectivist
interpretation of epistemic relevance in terms of the degree of a’s interest in
i. It is the sense in which one speaks of a subjectivist interpretation of prob-
ability, and should not be mistaken for any reference to the idiosyncratic
inclinations of an empirical epistemic agent or their phenomenological
analysis, as can be found e.g. in Schutz [1970]. 
3.2 Limits of the basic case
Common sense and scientific literature thus provide a good starting point,
namely [1]. Despite its popularity and several advantages, however, the
basic case is severely limited. One main shortcoming is that [1] is brittle, in
that it is forced to declare i irrelevant when condition Q (a, q, d, c, l) is not
satisfied. Obviously, even if a does not ask q, i (understood, following [1]
as the answer to q about d in c at l) may still be highly relevant to a. This is
what researchers and salesmen alike find distressing.
4. A probabilistic revision of the basic case
The first step is to revise [1] by making more explicit the relation between i
and q. We can then move from a rigid double-implication to a more flexible,
functional relation between the degree of relevance and the degree of prob-
ability of the two conditions concerning the questioning and the answer.8 
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Call A the degree of adequacy of the answer, that is, the degree in which
i satisfies q about d in c at l. One can define A as precisely as one wishes by
adapting the statistical concept of validity. Validity is the combination of
accuracy and precision, two other technical concepts also borrowed from
statistics.9 We shall say that i is an adequate answer to q insofar as it is a
valid answer to q, that is, insofar as it is an answer to q both accurate and
precise. 
We can now make [1] more resilient by considering the probability that
a may ask q and the probability that i may answer q adequately. Unfortu-
nately, the probability of asking a question is unrelated to the probability of
receiving an adequate answer (or life would be much easier), so the two
events are independent and their conjunction translates into a simple multi-
plication. By adopting this refinement we obtain:
 
 R (i) = P(Q (a, q, d, c, l)) × P(A (i, q, d, c, l)) [2]
4.1 Advantages of the probabilistic revision
[2] combines the advantages of [1] with the possibility of talking about
degrees of epistemic relevance (not just Boolean quantities) and adequacy.
This is coherent with a broader informational approach: in [2], the more
likely a is to ask q and the more adequate i is as answer to q, the more rele-
vant i becomes to a.
4.2 Limits of the probabilistic revision
The main disadvantage of [2] is that the epistemic relevance of i decreases
too rapidly in relation to the decrease in the probability of Q, and it becomes
utterly counterintuitive in some cases. Realistically, the informee a cannot
be considered omniscient, even if a is assumed to be so modal-logically
(Floridi [2006]). The world is informationally opaque to a, at least empiri-
cally, so a may often fail to request the information that would actually be
epistemically relevant to her, seen from a sort of God’s-eye perspective.
What happens when the probability that a may ask q is less than 1? As Fig-
ure 1 shows, in [2] there are four possible trends, since R tends towards 0 or
1 depending on whether both P(Q) and P(A) tend towards 0 or 1. Three out
of four cases in [2] are realistic and unproblematic. But when P(Q) tends to
0 while P(A) tends to 1, we re-encounter the counterintuitive collapse of
epistemic relevance already seen in § 1.2.c: i is increasingly irrelevant
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epistemically because it is increasingly unlikely that a may ask q, even
when the adequacy of i is made increasingly closer, or equal, to 1.
Figure 1: Four trends in formula [2]. The highlighted case is the problematic one. 
5. A counterfactual revision of the probabilistic analysis
The collapse can be avoided by revising [2] counterfactually. Instead of
analysing the probability that a might ask q, one needs to consider two sce-
narios: 
•  the case in which a asks q, i.e. P(Q) = 1, and 
•  the case in which a does not but might ask q, i.e. 0 ≤ P(Q) < 1. 
In the former case, the only variable that counts is the probability that i
might be adequate. In the latter case, one can consider the probability that a
would (have) ask(ed) q if a were (had been) sufficiently informed. Using
the standard symbol “ →“ for the counterfactual implication and simplify-
ing a bit our notation by omitting (q, d, c, l), we obtain:
The second line in [3] states that the epistemic relevance of i is a function of
the probability that i might be an adequate answer to q times the probability
that a would ask q if a were sufficiently informed about the availability of i.
   P(A(i))     if P(Q(a) = 1 
R (i) =                 [3] 
   P(Ia(i) Ƒo Q(a)) × P(A(i))    if 0 d P(Q(a)  < 1 
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5.1 Advantages of the counterfactual revision
The advantages of [3] are all the advantages of [1] and [2] plus the further
advantage of solving the problem of the opacity of epistemic relevance,
seen in § 4.2, and its corresponding collapse.
5.2 Limits of the counterfactual revision
The main limit of [3] may be labelled the counterfactual paradox of seman-
tic information and it is not avoidable without further revising the approach.
According to [3], assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that P(A(i, q, d, c, l))
= 1, i would be maximally relevant epistemically only if the probability is
also 1 that, if a had been informed that i was the answer, then a would have
asked q to obtain i. But this conditional reminds one of Meno’s Paradox.10
For, if a had held i in the first place, strictly speaking a would not have been
in any need to ask q to obtain i, so it is not true that a would have asked q
had he held i. It follows that [3] largely fails to deliver a good analysis of
epistemic relevance. “Strictly speaking” and “largely” are emphasised
because, in practice, i would be epistemically relevant if a is assumed to be
looking not for new information but for confirmation: a may ask q even if a
already knows that i is the answer, if a wishes to be reassured that i is
indeed the answer. Yet double-checking procedures are insufficient to res-
cue the analysis, for the complete reduction of relevance to confirmation
would work as a reductio ad absurdum.
6. A metatheoretical revision of the counterfactual 
analysis
The solution is to bypass the paradox by revising [3] metatheoretically.11
One can still rely on a’s rationality to gauge the epistemic relevance of i to a
herself without providing the actual content of i but only some information
about its availability. For if a had been informed that new information (ni)
about d was available, insofar as a would then have asked a question to
retrieve i, it follows that i would have been correspondingly more or less
epistemically relevant to a. Now, a simple way of constructing ni is by
changing the LoA l. For example, if a had been informed that something
had changed regarding the schedule of the meeting (higher LoA), a would
probably have asked what had changed about it, and the information that
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the meeting had been cancelled (lower LoA) would then be correctly analy-
sed as highly epistemically relevant to a. In this way we obtain:
or, by simplifying our notation:
A final refinement can now complete the analysis. In most cases, a is not
informed that ni is available. Rather, a may only be informed that ni might
be available. So, instead of analysing the probability that a would ask q
about d in c at lm if a were informed that new information ni is available
about d at ln, one should consider, more realistically, the case in which a is
informed that there is a probability P > 0 that there might be new informa-
tion ni about d at ln, that is, P(IaP(ni, ln) → Q(a, lm)). Note the scope of the
two probabilities: the formula should not be interpreted as a problematic
case of second order probability (Gaifman [1988]), as if the counterfactual
depended on the probability of the probability of a being informed. It is
actually a who is informed about the probability of ni. The revised formula,
with the usual simplifications, is: 
[6] synthesises the subjectivist interpretation of epistemic relevance.
   P(A(i, q, d, c, lm))                   
         if P(Q(a, q, d, c, lm) = 1 
R (i) =                 [4] 
   P(Ia(ni, d, ln) Ƒo Q(a, q, d, c, lm)) × P(A(i, q, d, c, lm))
         if 0 d P(Q(a, q, d, c, lm)  < 1 
   P(A(i, lm))     if P(Q(a, lm) = 1 
R (i) =                [5] 
   P(Ia(ni, ln) Ƒo Q(a, lm)) × P(A(i, lm) if 0 d P(Q(a, lm)  < 1 
   P(A(i, lm))     if P(Q(a, lm) = 1 
R (i) =                [6] 
   P(IaP(ni, ln) Ƒo Q(a, lm)) × P(A(i, lm)  if 0 d P(Q(a, lm)  < 1 
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7. Advantages of the metatheoretical revision
The availability of new information about d, retrievable at a higher LoA, is
like a sealed envelope for a: a is informed that new information is available
inside it, but does not hold the specific informational content (compare this
to the message “you have mail” sent by an email client). In this way, no ver-
sion of Meno’s paradox arises and one can also account for the prima facie
obligation that collaborative or informee-friendly informers may have
towards a. The trite answer “I didn’t tell you because you didn’t ask”,
offered when someone fails to provide some epistemically relevant infor-
mation, is now easily shown to be disingenuous. For either a should be
assumed to be in a standing state of querying about (i.e., as being interested
in) i, in which case the informer has a prima facie obligation to provide a
with i even if a did not explicitly ask for it. Imagine the case in which Peter,
a friend of Mary’s, knows that she has lost her job, but that she has not yet
been informed about this. It would be safe to assume Mary to be in a stand-
ing state of querying about such piece of information, so Peter, as a collabo-
rative informer, has a prima facie obligation to inform her. Or a may simply
be assumed to be reasonable enough to ask the appropriate question to
obtain i, if provided with sufficient metainformation about the availability
of i. In which case, the informer may have the prima facie obligation to pro-
vide at least enough metainformation about the availability of new informa-
tion. Peter has at least the prima facie obligation to tell Mary that something
might have happened regarding her job. Either way, not being explicitly
asked by the informee fails to be a proper justification for the (informee-
friendly) informer’s silence. 
A last, important advantage to be highlighted is that [6] is easily trans-
latable into a Bayesian network, which then facilitates the computation of
the various variables and subjective probabilities. 
To summarise, [6] is easily implementable as a Bayesian Network. It
explains why a collaborative informer has a prima facie epistemic obliga-
tion to inform a about i, or at least about its availability when the informer
does not know what i amounts to, even if the informee does not ask for i. As
we shall see in the next section, this is the fundamental assumption behind
the juridical concept of relevant information. It is also what may generate
conflicts in medical ethics, when epistemically relevant information may or
may not be shared with all interested parties.
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8. Some illustrative cases
As anticipated, the previous analysis is compatible with a large variety of
widespread usages of the concept of relevant information, to which it pro-
vides a unified, conceptual foundation. We have just seen the deontological
and Bayesian contexts. Three other examples will suffice to illustrate the
point and show how the conceptual ingredients found in [6] also occur in
the literature on relevance, even if unsystematically.
The idea of interpreting relevant information erotetically was already
exploited by Cohen [1994]. It is common in computer science and informa-
tion science, where relevant information is broadly treated as “information
whose subject matter matches that of a query” (Choo et al. [2000]). 
The connection between relevance, probability and counterfactual infer-
ence is drawn, although not too clearly, in jurisprudence. For example, the
U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence 401. Article IV. Relevancy and its limits
states that “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Essentially, the law of evidence treats epistemic relevance as a
relation between an informee a and two pieces of information p and q, such
that it renders p (e.g. information about the involvement of an agent in a
crime) more probable to a because of the occurrence of q (e.g. information
about the time and location of an agent when the crime was perpetrated)
either by itself, or in connection with other pieces of information (e.g. infor-
mation about means of transportation).
Finally, in pragmatics, relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson [1995])
states that “In relevance-theoretic terms, an input is relevant to an individ-
ual when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a posi-
tive cognitive effect. A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile difference
to the individual’s representation of the world – a true conclusion, for exam-
ple. False conclusions are not worth having (emphasis added). [...] Intu-
itively, relevance is not just an all-or-none matter but a matter of degree.
[...] Thus, relevance may be assessed in terms of cognitive effects and pro-
cessing effort: 
Relevance of an input to an individual 
a. other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects
achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the
individual at that time. 
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b. other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the
lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.” (Wilson and
Sperber [2004], p. 608). 
Although “relevance” is used in relevance theory as a technical term,12
it is easy to see how several elements in the previous quotation can also be
found included in [6], especially the informee-oriented, context-based,
query-driven nature of relevance. The improvements encapsulated in [6] are
threefold: 
1. semantic information (not just some linguistic item) is explicitly iden-
tified as the relevance-bearer; 
2. point (a) above is still assumed but it is now translated into a’s (coun-
terfactual) interest in asking q to obtain i, expressed by a’s query. This
translation no longer requires the problematic specification of what
may count as “positive cognitive effects”;
3. point (b) above is replaced by degrees of probability of obtaining i,
since [6] entirely decouples the degree of epistemic relevance of i
from the degree of cognitive (or computational) obtainability of i. It
seems counterintuitive to assume that “the greater the processing
effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual
at that time”. Indeed, if it weren’t for the technical use of “relevance”
stressed above, one might argue exactly the opposite: ceteris paribus,
some times it is precisely those bits of information more difficult to
obtain (access, process etc.) that are the most epistemically relevant.13 
A fundamental consequence of both the pragmatic approach (see the quota-
tion above) and the subjectivist interpretation (see [6]) is that false semantic
content fails to be relevant at all (for a different view see Dodig-Crnkovic
[2006]). This is the next point to be discussed.
9. Misinformation cannot be relevant
It is easy to be confused about both “relevance” and “misinformation”.
Regarding the former, we now have a clear analysis; regarding the latter,
elsewhere (Floridi [2005b]) I have shown that misinformation is “well-
formed and meaningful data (i.e. semantic content) that is false”.14 If we
analyse epistemic relevance in terms of cognitive efforts, clearly misinfor-
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mation makes no worthwhile difference to the informee/agent’s representa-
tion of the world. On the contrary, it is actually deleterious. If the train
leaves at 13.15, being told that it leaves at 14.25 is a nuisance to say the
least. Likewise, if we endorse [6], clearly no rational informee/agent would
be interested in receiving some misinformation as an answer to her query.15
That one might not know whether the answer counts as information is an
entirely different problem, one that involves trust, the reliability of both
sources and methods of information processing and of course skeptical
issues. That misinformation may turn out to be useful in some serendipitous
way is also a red herring. False (counterfeit) banknotes may be used to buy
some goods, but they would not, for this reason, qualify as legal tender.
Likewise, astrological data may, accidentally, lead to a scientific discovery
but they are not, for this reason, epistemically relevant information. Of
course, there are many ways in which misinformation may be indirectly,
inferentially or metatheoretically relevant, yet this is not what is in question
here. The student who answers “Napoleon” to the question “who fought at
Thermopylae?” has said something false and hence uninformative and a
fortiori epistemically irrelevant to someone who asked the question in order
to be informed about the battle, although his answer is informative about,
and hence might be epistemically relevant to someone interested in assess-
ing, the student’s historical education. It is because of this distinction that
the domain, context and the level of abstraction at which one is evaluating
epistemic relevance need to be kept clear and fixed in the course of the
analysis. If they are not, the outcome is a conceptual carnage.
In the end, the previous discussion shows that we are on the right track.
The pragmatic and the subjectivist interpretation of what may count as
communicationally or epistemically relevant semantic information coher-
ently converge on the same conclusion, even if they come from different
perspectives: had a known that i was actually a piece of misinformation she
would not have asked q in order to obtain i in the first place. Misinforma-
tion is not worth the effort, according to the pragmatic theory. It is unworthy
of a rational agent’s interest, according to the subjectivist interpretation.
These are two sides of the same coin.
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10. Conclusion
Agents require a constant flow and a high level of processing of relevant
information in order to interact successfully among themselves and with the
environment in which they are embedded. Standard theories of information
are silent on the nature of relevant semantic information. In this paper, a
subjectivist interpretation of relevance has been developed and defended. It
is based on a counterfactual and metatheoretical analysis of the degree of
relevance of (some semantic information) i to a rational informee/agent a as
a function of the accuracy of i understood as an answer to a question q,
given the probability that q might be asked by a. The interpretation, synthe-
sised in [6], vindicates the strongly semantic theory of information, accord-
ing to which semantic information encapsulates truth. It has been shown to
be able to account satisfactorily for several important applications and
interpretations of the concept of relevant information. Finally, the interpre-
tation provides the missing foundation for a general theory of relevance. It
constitutes the hub for several other theories of relevance already developed
in the literature. And it is a hub that can be easily expanded by other mod-
ules. Two are worth stressing in this conclusion. First, [6] is easily com-
bined with theories of belief upgrade. This is crucial, since the latter can
explain how degrees of relevance may be dynamically upgraded following
the evolution of a’s background information and beliefs and feedback
loops. Second, [6] is perfectly compatible with subjectivist interpretations
of probability and Bayesian learning. Clearly these are implications and
applications that will be worth developing.16
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Notes
1. For an overview see Bremer and Cohnitz [2004] and Floridi [2004a].
2. The problem is accurately described in Crestani et al. [1998].
3. “A specific ‘entity’ (such as an action, training sample, attribute, background proposition,
or inference step) is irrelevant to a task in some context if the appropriate response to the
task does not change by an unacceptable [sic] amount if we change the entity in that
context, Otherwise, we view that entity as (somewhat) relevant to the task. This view is
explicitly stated in the paper by Galles and Pearl, which deals with causality and where a
perturbation corresponds to a material change in the physical world.” Subramanian et al.
[1997], p. 2.
4. The adequacy of the Körner criterion of relevance for propositional logic has been proved
by Schroder [1992].
5. The analysis of relevance also depends on the level of abstraction (Floridi and Sanders
[2004]) at which the process of assessment is conducted. A level of abstraction may be
seen as the precise specification of the way in which some information is being accessed
and processed, cf. the analysis of “the point of view” according to which something is
relevant in Cohen [1994].
6. A question Q is loaded if the respondent is committed to (some part of) the presupposition
of Q (Walton [1991], 340) e.g. “how many times did you kiss Mary?” which presupposes
that you did kiss Mary at least once.
7. Two further consequences are that (i) rational agents cannot possess exactly the same
information and agree to disagree about the probability of some past or future events. In
fact, they must independently come to the same conclusion, and (ii) they cannot surprise
each other informationally.
8. Bowles [1990] follows a similar strategy to explain probabilistically the relation of
relevance in propositional inferences.
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9. Accuracy is the degree of conformity of a measure or calculated parameter to its actual
(true) value. Precision (also called reproducibility or repeatability) is the degree to which
further measurements or calculations show the same or similar results.
10. Plato, Meno 80d-81a.
11. This solution is partly adopted in information theory by Tishby et al. [1999], who “define
the relevant information in a signal  as being the information that this signal
provides about another signal . Examples include the information that face images
provide about the names of the people portrayed, or the information that speech sounds
provide about the words spoken.” Note that what they treat as “relevance” is really a
quantitative relation of structural conjunction, which can be considered a necessary
condition for semantic relevance, but should not be confused with it.
12. “Relevance here is a technical term (though clearly related to the natural language
homonym), whereby an intepretation is relevant only in cases where the cognitive cost of
processing the event which demands the attention of the agent is outweighed by the
cognitive benefits of that processing (where benefits include deriving or strengthening
new assumptions, and confirming or rejecting previous assumptions). ‘Optimal relevance’
states that the first interpretation which crosses the relevance threshold is the right one;
that is, that the first relevant interpretation the addressee arrives at is the one the speaker
intended to communicate.” (Emma Borg, Intention-Based Semantics, in Lepore and Smith
[2006], p. 255).
13. Ziv [1988] has argued that relevance theory needs to be supplemented by a theory of
rationality of causal relations, in other words, what in this paper has been called causal
relevance (following Hitchcock [1992]) and the assumption of a rational agent.
14. “Disinformation” is misinformation purposefully conveyed to mislead the receiver into
believing that it is information.
15. This is consistent with the truth requirement established in Cohen [1994]. 
16. I am grateful to the organisers of the 30th Wittgenstein Symposium, especially Herbert
Hrachovec and Alois Pichler, and to the participants to the meeting, especially Fred
Dretske, for the opportunity to discuss the contents of this paper and for their feedback
during the presentation. The reader interested in the topic may wish to know that a much
longer, more detailed and slightly more technical version of this paper is forthcoming in
Erkenntnis.
x X∈
y Y∈
ok-floridi.fm  Page 312  Tuesday, April 8, 2008  1:16 PM
